UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov

APPLICATION NO.	FILING DATE	FIRST NAMED INVENTOR	ATTORNEY DOCKET NO.	CONFIRMATION NO.
10/674,834	09/30/2003	Rene Bitsch	M61.12-0531	4476
	7590 04/10/200 HAMPLIN (MICROSC	EXAMINER		
SUITE 1400	`	LY, ANH		
900 SECOND AVENUE SOUTH MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55402-3319			ART UNIT	PAPER NUMBER
			2162	
			MAIL DATE	DELIVERY MODE
		04/10/2008	PAPER	

Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.

The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.

Advisory Action Before the Filing of an Appeal Brief

Application No.	Applicant(s)	
10/674,834	BITSCH ET AL.	
Examiner	Art Unit	
ANH LY	2162	

	ANH LY	2162	
The MAILING DATE of this communication appe	ars on the cover sheet with the o	correspondence add	ress
THE REPLY FILED <u>20 March 2008</u> FAILS TO PLACE THIS AP	PLICATION IN CONDITION FOR	ALLOWANCE.	
1. The reply was filed after a final rejection, but prior to or on application, applicant must timely file one of the following application in condition for allowance; (2) a Notice of Apperent for Continued Examination (RCE) in compliance with 37 C periods:	the same day as filing a Notice of a replies: (1) an amendment, affidavieal (with appeal fee) in compliance	Appeal. To avoid abar t, or other evidence, w with 37 CFR 41.31; or	hich places the (3) a Request
a) The period for reply expires 3 months from the mailing date b) The period for reply expires on: (1) the mailing date of this Ar no event, however, will the statutory period for reply expire la Examiner Note: If box 1 is checked, check either box (a) or (I) MONTHS OF THE FINAL REJECTION. See MPEP 706.07(f)	dvisory Action, or (2) the date set forth hter than SIX MONTHS from the mailing b). ONLY CHECK BOX (b) WHEN THE	g date of the final rejection	n.
Extensions of time may be obtained under 37 CFR 1.136(a). The date of have been filed is the date for purposes of determining the period of extunder 37 CFR 1.17(a) is calculated from: (1) the expiration date of the set forth in (b) above, if checked. Any reply received by the Office later may reduce any earned patent term adjustment. See 37 CFR 1.704(b). NOTICE OF APPEAL	on which the petition under 37 CFR 1.1 ension and the corresponding amount of hortened statutory period for reply origi	of the fee. The appropria nally set in the final Offic	ate extension fee e action; or (2) as
 The Notice of Appeal was filed on A brief in completing the Notice of Appeal (37 CFR 41.37(a)), or any exter Notice of Appeal has been filed, any reply must be filed with AMENDMENTS 	nsion thereof (37 CFR 41.37(e)), to	avoid dismissal of the	
	t mujan ta tha data of filing a bujaf	will make a second ba	
 The proposed amendment(s) filed after a final rejection, because (a) They raise new issues that would require further cor 			cause
(b) They raise the issue of new matter (see NOTE below		i L below),	
(c) They are not deemed to place the application in bett appeal; and/or	· ·	ducing or simplifying th	ne issues for
(d) They present additional claims without canceling a c	corresponding number of finally reje	ected claims.	
NOTE: (See 37 CFR 1.116 and 41.33(a)).			
4. The amendments are not in compliance with 37 CFR 1.12 5. Applicant's reply has overcome the following rejection(s):		mpliant Amendment (I	PTOL-324).
6. Newly proposed or amended claim(s) would be all non-allowable claim(s).		timely filed amendmer	t canceling the
7. For purposes of appeal, the proposed amendment(s): a) [how the new or amended claims would be rejected is prov The status of the claim(s) is (or will be) as follows:		l be entered and an ex	xplanation of
Claim(s) allowed: Claim(s) objected to:			
Claim(s) rejected: <u>1,4-19 and 41</u> . Claim(s) withdrawn from consideration:			
AFFIDAVIT OR OTHER EVIDENCE			
 The affidavit or other evidence filed after a final action, but because applicant failed to provide a showing of good and was not earlier presented. See 37 CFR 1.116(e). 			
9. The affidavit or other evidence filed after the date of filing entered because the affidavit or other evidence failed to or showing a good and sufficient reasons why it is necessary	vercome <u>all</u> rejections under appea	al and/or appellant fails	s to provide a
10.	n of the status of the claims after er	ntry is below or attach	ed.
11. The request for reconsideration has been considered but See Continuation Sheet.	does NOT place the application in	condition for allowan	ce because:
12. Note the attached Information <i>Disclosure Statement</i> (s). (13. Other:	PTO/SB/08) Paper No(s)		
	/JEAN B. FLEURANTIN		
	Primary Examiner, Art U	TIIL Z 10Z	

U.S. Patent and Trademark Office PTOL-303 (Rev. 08-06) Continuation of 11. does NOT place the application in condition for allowance because:

The prior art of record teaches the claimed limitations as indicated in the previous Office action.

Applicant argued that, "There is no teaching in Sugimoto that such identifier information is text;" (page 9, 3rd paragraph, in the remarks)

In response to Appellant's arguments, Examiner respectfully disagrees as Sugimoto teaches the controller is congigured so that it compares/matches an identifier containing the label information and when those two idefiners agree, matching then using that label information to create a new label or label image. And also, the identifier stored in this registry is compared against the sponsor identifier in the label information when new label information is introduced, and a determination is made as to whether or not that label is to be used. And when these two identifiers match, the notification information display apparatus displays that label. If the two identifiers do not match, the display of that label is disabled (col. 16, lines 22-30; also see col. 4, lines 27-40 and col. 14, lines 8-12).

Applicant argued that, "receiving data at the interface indicating how the new label is to be used" (page 10, 1st and 2nd paragraphs, in the remarks).

In response to Appellant's arguments, Examiner respectfully disagrees as Sugimoto teaches display apparatus can be sent, received, transmited notification inforation or message (the notification information display apparatus is configured so that terminal specifying information for specifying a given notification information display apparatus can be sent to another notification information display pparatus with prescribed timing, and so that, based on terminal specifying information received from another notification information display apparatus, a list of other notification information display apparatuses to which the given notification information display apparatus is capable of transmitting message information can be displayed, inclusive of a transmit enablement display) dialog box such as pop-up or pull-down menu for selection how the input to be processed or used (fig. 2, items 210 and 211; col. 4, lines 50-67 and col. 5, lines 1-8 and col. 9, lines 30-42 and col. 13, lines 5-32 and col. 18, lines 22-67).

Applicant argued that, Sugimoto and VanDenAvond are combined, they not render obvious each claimed limitation." (page 11, 1st, 2nd and 4th paragraphs, in the remarks).

In response to Appellant's arguments, Examiner respectfully disagrees.

The examiner recognizes that obviousness can only be established by combining or modifying the teachings of the prior art to produce the claimed invention where there is some teaching, suggestion, or motivation to do so found either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art. See In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 5 USPQ2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988) and In re Jones, 958 F.2d 347, 21 USPQ2d 1941 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In this case, Sugimoto and VanDenAvond are from the same field of endeavor and both are directed to using user interface to receive input informaton for managing label. One having ordinary skill in the art would have found it motivated to combine the teachings of Sugimoto and VanDenAvond because that would provide Sugimoto's system having capability of ensuring compiance with label thereby enabling user to have a significant challenge for organization and eleiminating redundances and in-efficiencies processes (see VandenAvond's paragraphs 0003 and 0009). Also, VanDenAvond teaches ID of the selected label as shown in fig. 4, paragrpags 0026, 0047 and 0052 and 0056). Moreover, the examiner kindly submits that the applicants misread the applicable references used in the last office action. However, when read and analyzed in light the specification, the invention as claimed does not support applicant's assertions. Actually, applicants are interpreting the claims very narrow without considering the broad teaching of the references used in the rejections. Additionally, it is important to note that the examiner interpretation of the claims, wherein, the examiner explicitly stated passages in the cited references which were not even addressed. The aforementioned assertion wherein all the limitations are not taught or suggested by the prior of record, was unsupported by objective factual evidence and was not found to be substantial evidentiary value. The examiner has provided in the last office action, a convincing one of reasoning as to why the artisan would have found the claimed invention to have been obvious in light of the teachings of the cited references. Applicants are reminded that 37 CFR 1.111(b) states, a general allegation that the claims define a patentable invention without specifically printing out how the language of the claims patentably distinguishes them from the references does not comply with the requirements of this section. Therefore, the applicants have failed to provided prima facie evidence how the language of the claims patentably distinguished them from the cited references. Hence, the applicants' assertions are just mere allegation with no supported fact. In response to applicant's argument that the examiner's conclusion of obviousness is based upon improper hindsight reasoning, it must be recognized that any judgment on obviousness is in a sense necessarily a reconstruction based upon hindsight reasoning. But so long as it takes into account only knowledge which was within the level of ordinary skill at the time the claimed invention was made, and does not include knowledge gleaned only from the applicant's disclosure, such a reconstruction is proper. See In re McLaughlin, 443 F.2d 1392, 170 USPQ 209 (CCPA 1971).

For the above reasons, Examiner believed that rejection of the last Office action was proper. Thus, the Examiner maintains the rejection. .